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LAST PROPHYLACTIC STANDING:
WHY THE QUARLES' "PUBLIC-SAFETY
EXCEPTION" SHOULD NOT BE EXPANDED TO
EXCUSE EDWARDS VIOLATIONS THAT OCCUR




At ten o'clock on a mild Tuesday morning in September, D.B. Cooper
commits an armed robbery at House of Cards Savings & Loan. Cooper
flees the scene on foot and traverses through a predominately residential
neighborhood in an effort to elude the police. During his flight he travels
over three miles through the backyards of homes, the grounds of a junior
high school, and a playground attached to a church's daycare center.
Lieutenant McClain finally finds Cooper one hour later hiding in Bart
Simpson's tree house and arrests him. McClain's custodial search incident
to the lawful arrest reveals that Cooper is no longer carrying the gun that
was used during the armed robbery. McClain reads Cooper the Miranda
warnings' and then asks him where the gun is. Cooper refuses to answer
the question and immediately and unequivocally invokes his right to have
an attorney present during his questioning.2 McClain reasonably believes
*Candidate for J.D., St. John's University School of Law, Class of 2010. Bachelor of Science in
Criminal Justice, summa cum laude, St. John's University, Class of 2006. Thank you to Professor
Elaine Chiu, Associate Professor of Law at St. John's University School of Law, for your guidance
while composing this note.
1 These warnings . . . are: a suspect "has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be
used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he
cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires."
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 435 (2000) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479
(1966)).
2 See, e.g., Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482 (1981) ("[An accused has a Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation.").
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that Cooper must have ditched the gun in the midst of his flight somewhere
between the bank and the place of his arrest. McClain worries because he
knows that at noon the junior high school and the church's daycare center
will let out for recess, and the neighborhood will be bustling with children
who could possibly stumble upon Cooper's gun. McClain is familiar with
the "public-safety exception" 3 to the requirement that Miranda warnings be
given before a suspect's answers may be admitted into evidence. 4 He
knows that it applies when officers ask questions reasonably prompted by a
concern for the public safety.5 McClain must now determine whether the
exception may be utilized to permit continued questioning of Cooper
despite his invocation of the right to an attorney 6 in order to procure
information about the whereabouts of the gun and quell the imminent threat
to public safety.
The issue facing Lieutenant McClain is currently an unresolved issue of
law.7 The Supreme Court has never answered the question of whether the
"public-safety exception" 8 can be applied post-Miranda warnings to excuse
continued questioning of a suspect who has invoked his right to an attorney
and to allow any statements volunteered during that questioning to be
admitted into evidence at trial. 9 The Court also has yet to determine the
admissibility of physical evidence that is derived from statements obtained
during such questioning.10 Should police officers be allowed, during
3 See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 657 (1984) (concluding that a need for answers to
questions when circumstances pose a threat to the public safety outweighs the need for the prophylactic
Miranda warnings requirement); see also State v. Cosby, 169 P.3d 1128, 1137 (Kan. 2007) (stating that
"the need to ascertain the location of a potential danger to the public outweigh[s] the need for the
prophylactic rule' of Miranda" (quoting Quarles, 467 U.S. at 657)).
4 See Quarles, 467 U.S. at 655.
5 See id. at 656.
6 See Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85 (holding that custodial questioning must cease when the
accused invokes his right to an attorney).
7 See State v. Harris, 544 N.W.2d 545, 549 n.5 (Wis. 1996) (noting that "the United States Supreme
Court has yet to rule directly on [this] point"); see also People v. Zanini, No. F038571, 2003 WL
103464, at *5 (Cal. App. 5 Dist. Jan. 10, 2003) (stating that "[t]he 'knotty issue' of whether the
Edwards no-recontact rule is subject to a public safety exception has not been addressed by . . . the
United States Supreme Court . , . ").
8 See Quarles, 467 U.S. at 655-56 ("[T]here is a 'public safety' exception to the requirement that
Miranda warnings be given before a suspect's answers may be admitted into evidence, and that the
availability of that exception does not depend upon the motivation of the individual officers involved.");
see also Cosby, 169 P.3d at 1137 ("[TJhe need to ascertain the location of a potential danger to the
public outweigh[s] the need for the 'prophylactic rule' of Miranda." (quoting Quarles, 467 U.S. at
657)).
9 See Harris, 544 N.W.2d at 549 n.5 ("[T]he United States Supreme Court has yet to rule directly
on point."); see also Zanini, 2003 WL 103464, at *5 ("The 'knotty issue' of whether the Edwards no-
recontact rule is subject to a public safety exception has not been addressed by .. . the United States
Supreme Court.. . "); see also Cosby, 169 P.3d at 1138 ("There is a split of authority on this issue.").
10 See Harris, 544 N.W.2d at 549 n.5 ("The [Supreme] Court has not addressed the question of
admissibility of physical evidence derived from an Edwards violation.").
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exigent "public safety" circumstances, to continue questioning a suspect
who has invoked his right to an attorney? If yes, should courts allow the
incriminating statements obtained, or the physical evidence that arises out
of those statements, to be admitted into evidence at trial?
Four compelling interests must be balanced while contemplating these
questions. The public safety, the suspect's right against self-incrimination
and to an attorney," the admissibility of statements obtained during
continued questioning, and the admissibility of derivative physical
evidence must be properly weighed in creating a rule to govern police
behavior and provide evidentiary standards for exigent "public safety"
circumstances. Should police be forced to stop questioning a suspect who
could help put an end to an imminent threat to public safety once he has
invoked his right to an attorney? Does an imminent threat to public safety
justify the denial of a suspect's right to have an attorney present during
interrogation? Should statements obtained during continued questioning of
a suspect after the right to an attorney has been invoked be admissible at
trial? What about physical evidence arising out of those statements?
This note argues that when circumstances present a real and immediate
threat to public safety, law enforcement should be allowed to continue
questioning a suspect who has invoked his right to counsel. Statements
made during such questioning, however, should be suppressed at trial. 12
Instead of the "public-safety exception," other Fifth Amendment
principles' 3 should be utilized to allow the introduction of evidence arising
out of those statements, while simultaneously suppressing the actual
incriminating statements themselves. This solution will strike the
11 See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself[."); see also Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482 (1980) ("Miranda thus
declared that an accused has a Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment right to have counsel present during
custodial interrogation.").
12 See Edwards, 451 U.S. at 487 (holding that statements that the defendant made after he invoked
his right to counsel were inadmissible at trial).
13 See Quarles, 467 U.S. at 660 (O'Conner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating, I
would require the suppression of the initial statement taken from respondent. . . [N]othing in Miranda
or the privilege itself requires exclusion of nontestimonial evidence derived from informal custodial
interrogation, and I therefore agree . . . that admission of the gun in evidence is proper"); United States
v. Cherry, 794 F.2d 201, 207-08 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that when a suspect's right to an attorney is
ignored the statements taken in violation of Miranda should be suppressed; however since the
statements were voluntary, his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination was not violated, and
the physical evidence derived from that statement does not have to be suppressed); Michigan v. Tucker,
417 U.S. 433, 446-47 (1974) (concluding that when police conduct violates the prophylactic standards
laid down in Miranda, but does not violate the defendant's constitutional privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination, the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule does not apply to suppress derivative
evidence); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 309 (1985) (finding that a violation of the prophylactic
Miranda procedures is not necessarily a Fifth Amendment violation, and therefore subsequent
statements need not be suppressed if the statements were made knowingly and voluntarily).
3812011]
JOURNALOFCIVE RIGIlS & ECONOMICDEVELOPMENT [Vol.25:2
appropriate balance between the four interests at stake.
Part I of this note discusses the Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination, its procedural safeguards, and the current applicable Fifth
Amendment evidentiary rules. Part II introduces the "public-safety
exception" to the administration of the Miranda warnings and considers the
rationale justifying its adoption to excuse continued questioning of a
suspect who has invoked his right to counsel during exigent "public safety"
circumstances. This Part then argues that a failure by police to administer
the Miranda warnings is distinguishable from a failure to honor the
invocation of the right to counsel, and therefore the adoption of the "public-
safety exception" to these circumstances is inappropriate. Part III argues
that other exceptions apply such that law enforcement should be allowed to
continue questioning a suspect after he has invoked his right to counsel.
This Part further concludes that the statements obtained during that
questioning should be suppressed at trial, but that absent coercion, the
"fruits" of those statements should be admissible.
I. THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
This section explores the Fifth Amendment protection against self-
incrimination and its safeguard in the constitutionally basedl4 Miranda
warnings. Next, it introduces the bright-line rule forbidding continued
questioning of a suspect who has invoked the right to counsel. 15 Finally, it
discusses the evidentiary rulesl 6 that govern Miranda violations.
A. The Fifth Amendment Right Against Self-Incrimination and its Miranda
Safeguard
The Fifth Amendment guarantees that "[n]o person ... shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."' 7 The
Miranda warnings are procedural safeguards that protect that right.18 In
14 See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000) ("[W]e conclude that Miranda
announced a constitutional rule[.]").
15 See Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85 (holding that custodial questioning must cease when the
accused invokes his right to an attorney).
16 See, e.g., Tucker, 417 U.S. at 446-47 (determining that when police conduct violates the
prophylactic standards laid down in Miranda, but not the defendant's constitutional privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination, the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule does not apply to suppress
derivative evidence); Elstad, 470 U.S. at 309 (finding that a violation of the prophylactic Miranda
procedures is not necessarily a Fifth Amendment violation, and therefore subsequent statements need
not be suppressed under the exclusionary rule if the statements were made knowingly and voluntarily).
17 Quarles, 467 U.S. at 654.
18 See Tucker, 417 U.S. at 444 (noting that the Miranda rights are procedural safeguards that insure
382
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Miranda v. Arizona,19 the Supreme Court held that certain warnings must
be given before a statement made by a suspect during a custodial
interrogation may be admitted into evidence. 20 The administration of these
warnings is necessary to ensure that a suspect's statements are voluntary, 21
since the coercion that is inherent in custodial interrogation heightens the
risk that an individual will not be accorded his Fifth Amendment
privilege. 22 A suspect must be specifically informed of his Miranda rights
and must voluntarily decide to forgo those rights in order for the statements
made during custodial circumstances to be admissible.23
Since deciding Miranda, the Court has retreated somewhat from the
absolute nature of the Miranda warnings requirement. 24 The Miranda
warnings requirement has subsequently been described as a "practical
reinforcement" of the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination 25
rather than a right protected by the Constitution.26 The Court has concluded
that Miranda "sweeps more broadly than the Fifth Amendment itself."27
Since the Fifth Amendment "does not prohibit all incriminating
admissions," 28 the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is
that the right against compulsory self-incrimination is protected); see also Hannon v. Sanner, 441 F.3d
635, 637 (8th Cir. 2006) (stating that the Miranda rights are "not themselves rights protected by the
Constitution" but are instead "measures to insure that the right against compulsory self-incrimination
[is] protected."); United States v. Spencer, 955 F.2d 814, 818 (2d Cir. 1992) (discussing the Tucker
court's distinction between "a violation of a defendant's constitutional rights and a mere violation of
Miranda's prophylactic safeguards.
19 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966) (providing the warnings and waiver that are necessary to use
evidence obtained during an interrogation against a defendant at trial).
20 Id; Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 431 (2000) (reiterating "that certain warnings
must be given before a suspect's statement made during custodial interrogation could be admitted in
evidence" (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478-79)).
21 See id. at 432-33 (describing how prior to Miranda, the Supreme Court evaluated the
admissibility of a suspect's confession under a voluntariness test).
22 See id. at 435 (discussing the Miranda court's conclusion that the inherent coercion during
custodial interrogation heightens the risk that an individual will not be accorded his Fifth Amendment
privilege).
23 See Quarles, 467 U.S. at 654 (summarizing the findings of the Miranda court).
24 See, e.g, id. at 655-56 (holding that "there is a 'public safety' exception to the requirement that
Miranda warnings be given before a suspect's answers may be admitted into evidence . . . ."); see also
Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 454 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The proposition that failure to comply with
Miranda 's rules does not establish a constitutional violation was central to the holdings of Tucker,
Hass, Quarles, and Elstad.").
25 Quarles, 467 U.S. at 654 ("Requiring Miranda warnings before custodial interrogation provides
'practical reinforcement' for the Fifth Amendment right." (citing Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444
(1974))).
26 See id.; Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974) ("[T]hese procedural safeguards [are] not
themselves rights protected by the Constitution but [are] instead measure to insure that the right against
compulsory self-incrimination was protected.").
27 Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306 (1985) (noting that the Miranda exclusionary rule "serves
the Fifth Amendment and sweeps more broadly than the Fifth Amendment itself").
28 Quarles, 467 U.S. at 654 (discussing the Fifth Amendment lack of prohibiting incriminating
admissions).
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not violated by even the most damning admissions absent some officially
coerced self-accusation. 29 The Fifth Amendment prohibits only compelled
testimony; 30 therefore, statements that are otherwise voluntary, but are
taken without properly administering the Miranda warnings,3 1 do not
necessarily violate the Fifth Amendment. 32 Voluntary statements taken
without following proper Miranda procedures may be admissible in certain
circumstances. 33 Despite the limiting language of the decision and its
numerous exceptions,34 Miranda was recently reaffirmed 35 as a
"constitutional decision." 36 Miranda now stands as a "concrete
constitutional guidelin[e] for law enforcement agencies and courts to
follow." 37
B. The Protection Against Continued Questioning After Invoking the Right
to an Attorney During Custodial Interrogations: The Edwards Bright-
Line Rule
The Supreme Court's decision in Edwards v. Arizona38 provided further
29 Id. (noting that "'absent some officially coerced self-accusation, the Fifth Amendment privilege
is not violated by even the most damning admissions."' (quoting United States v. Washington, 431 U.S.
181, 187 (1977))).
30 See Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District, 542 U.S. 177, 189 (2004) ("The Fifth Amendment prohibits
only compelled testimony that is incriminating."); Elstad, 470 U.S. at 306-07 ("The Fifth Amendment
prohibits use by the prosecution in its case in chief only of compelled testimony.").
31 See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 432-33 (2000) ("Prior to Miranda, [the Supreme
Court] evaluated the admissibility of a suspect's confession under a voluntariness test"); Tucker, 417
U.S. at 441 ("Before Miranda the principal issue [in determining Fifth Amendment violations] ... was.
. . whether [the defendant's] statement was 'voluntary.'); Robert L. Gottsfield, Is Miranda Still With
US? Are the Police Duty-Bound to Comply?, 43 ARIZ. Arr'Y 12, 13 (2006) ("There is a difference
between the issues presented by whether Miranda warnings were properly given and the voluntariness
of a confession in a criminal prosecution.").
32 See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306 (1985) ("The Miranda exclusionary rule, however,
serves the Fifth Amendment and sweeps more broadly than the Fifth Amendment itself. It may be
triggered even in the absence of a Fifth Amendment violation.").
33 See, e.g., Quarles, 467 U.S. at 655-56 (holding that "there is a 'public safety' exception to the
requirement that Miranda warnings be given before a suspect's answers may be admitted into evidence .
. ."); Elstad, 470 U.S. at 307 (citing Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (noting that although
"patently voluntary statements taken in violation of Miranda must be excluded from the prosecution's
case," the presumption of coercion does not bar the use of those statements for impeachment purposes
on cross-examination). See generally, Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 432-33 (describing how prior to Miranda,
the Supreme Court evaluated the admissibility of a suspect's confession under a voluntariness test).
34 See, e.g., Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 454 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The proposition that failure
to comply with Miranda's rules does not establish a constitutional violation was central to the holdings
of Tucker, Hass, Quarles, and Elstad.").
35 See id at 441 (indicating that the cases finding exceptions to Miranda "illustrate the principle -
not that Miranda is not a constitutional rule - but that no constitutional rule is immutable").
36 Id. at 444 ("In sum, we conclude that Miranda announced a constitutional rule that Congress
may not supersede legislatively.").
37 Id. at 439 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 441-42 (1966)).
38 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
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procedural protection 39 against self-incrimination by announcing a bright-
line rule that supplied clear and unequivocal guidelines for how to deal
with a suspect who invoked his right to counsel40 during a custodial
interrogation.4 1 In Edwards, a murder suspect was arrested in his house
pursuant to a warrant and brought to the police station for questioning.42 At
the station, officers administered the Miranda warnings. 43 The suspect
stated that he understood his rights and that he was willing to submit to
questioning.44 During the interrogation, the suspect stated that he sought to
"make a deal," and the interrogating officer provided him with the
telephone number of a county attorney. 45 After making the call, the suspect
proclaimed that he wanted an attorney before making a deal.46 At that point
the questioning ceased and the suspect was taken to county jail.47 The next
morning two officers went to the jail in order to meet with the suspect. 48
The suspect was told that he had to speak with the officers even though he
did not wish to.49 The officers once again informed the suspect of his
Miranda rights, and the suspect indicated that he would be willing to speak
with them if he could first hear a recording of an alleged accomplice
implicating him in the crime. 50 After hearing the recording, the suspect
implicated himself in the crime. 51 At trial, the suspect sought to suppress
his confession on the ground that his Miranda rights were violated when
the officers returned to question him after he invoked his right to counsel.52
The Supreme Court agreed.53
39 See id at 484 (determining that even though the accused may validly waive his rights after being
properly given his Miranda warnings, "additional safeguards are necessary when the accused asks for
counsel").
40 Id. at 482 ("The accused's right to counsel during custodial interrogation arises ... under the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.").
41 State v. Harris, 544 N.W.2d 545, 549 (Wis. 1996) (quoting Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85)
(discussing what to do when the accused expresses his desire to have counsel present).
42 Edwards, 451 U.S. at 478.
43 Id.
4 Id.






51 See id. (describing how Edwards agreed to make a statement to the officers as long as it was not
tape-recorded and then proceeded to implicate himself in the crime).
52 Id ("Prior to trial, Edwards moved to suppress his confession on the ground that his Miranda
rights had been violated when the officers returned to question him after he had invoked his right to
counsel.").
53 See id at 487 ("We think it is clear that Edwards was subjected to custodial interrogation ... and
that this occurred at the instance of the authorities. His statement, made without having had access to
counsel, did not amount to a valid waiver and hence was inadmissible.").
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The Court held that once a suspect expresses his desire to deal with the
police only through counsel, he should not be subject to further
interrogation until counsel has been made available to him or he himself
initiates further communication with the police.54 The fact that the suspect
responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation did not
establish a valid waiver of a previously asserted right to counsel.55 This
rule would apply even if he had been advised of his rights.56
Edwards stands firmly for the proposition that a suspect's request for an
attorney is an invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights and requires that
all interrogation cease.57 When the police continue to question a suspect
after he has invoked his right to an attorney, they violate the bright-line rule
in Edwards.58 Statements made by a suspect during questioning that violate
the Edwards rule must be suppressed.59 The Supreme Court, however, has
never determined the admissibility of physical evidence derived from an
Edwards violation. 60
C. Evidentiary Rules that Govern Miranda Violations: Tucker and Elstad
A brief discussion of the evidentiary rules that govern Miranda
violations is necessary to provide guidance and context for the rule that this
note proposes. Since the Supreme Court has never determined the
admissibility of physical evidence derived from a violation of the Edwards
rule,61 these evidentiary principles provide insight into the Court's
understanding of the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and
its relationship to the Miranda safeguard.
A comparison to the evidentiary remedy for police violations of the
Fourth Amendment proscription against "unreasonable searches and
seizures" 62 is necessary to understand the relationship between the Fifth
54 Id. at 484-85 ("Edwards, having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through
counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available
to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication. . . .").
55 Id. at 484 (stating that waiver cannot be established even if a suspect is advised of his rights).
56 Id. (indicating that even if the suspect responds to police initiated interrogation after asking for
counsel to be present, waiver is not valid).
57 Id. at 485 (noting that it is a 'rigid rule that an accused's request for an attorney is per se an
invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights . .. "' (quoting Fare v. Michael C., 422 U.S. 707, 719 (1979))).
58 Id. at 484-85 (discussing what is necessary once the accused asks for counsel).
59 Id. at 487 ("His statement, made without having had access to counsel, did not amount to a valid
waiver and hence was inadmissible.").
60 State v. Harris, 544 N.W.2d 545, 549 n.5 (Wis. 1996) ("The [Supreme] Court has not addressed
the question of admissibility of physical evidence derived from an Edwards violation.").
61 Id. (discussing the lack of Supreme Court decisions on this topic).
62 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . .").
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Amendment right against being "compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against [oneself]" 63 and its Miranda safeguard. A procedural
Miranda violation differs significantly from a Fourth Amendment
violation.64
Fourth Amendment violations have traditionally mandated the broad
application of what has come to be known as the "fruit of the poisonous
tree" 65 exclusionary rule. 66 Evidence seized during an unlawful search
cannot be introduced at trial as evidence against the victim of that unlawful
search.67 In addition, tangible materials, or "fruits," obtained as a direct
result of an unlawful invasion, or "the poisonous tree," are also barred from
trial. 68 Evidence that has been discovered by exploiting an illegal search or
seizure, rather then by "means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of
the primary taint" of the Fourth Amendment violation, must be
suppressed.69
In Michigan v. Tucker,70 the Supreme Court distinguished a Miranda
violation from a Fourth Amendment violation by holding that when law
enforcement officers unknowingly 71 departed from the prophylactic
Miranda standards, but did not abridge the suspect's constitutional
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, 72 the case was not
controlled by the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine. 73 The question of
whether police conduct directly infringed upon a suspect's right against
63 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
6 See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306 (1985) (discussing the differences between Fourth and
Fifth Amendment violations and clarifying that "[w]here a Fourth Amendment violation 'taints' the
confession, a finding of voluntariness for the purposes of the Fifth Amendment is merely a threshold
requirement in determining whether the confession may be admitted into evidence); Taylor v. Alabama,
457 U.S. 687, 690 (1982) (explaining that when the exclusionary rule is used to effectuate the Fourth
Amendment, it serves interests and policies that are distinct from those that it serves when it is used to
effectuate the Fourth Amendment).
65 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963) (holding seized evidence to be "fruit of
the poisonous tree" where it was discovered only "by the exploitation of' an illegal search).
66 Elstad, 470 U.S. at 306 ("The purpose of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule is to deter
unreasonable searches, no matter how probative their fruits.").
67 See Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 484 (citing Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914)) (finding
petitioner's incriminating statements made to the police immediately after an unlawful entry into
petitioner's home inadmissible).
68 Id. at 485 ("The exclusionary rule has traditionally barred from trial physical, tangible materials
obtained either during or as a direct result of unlawful invasion.").
69 Id. at 488 (quoting JOHN MACARTHUR MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT 221 (Little, Brown and
Company 1959)).
70 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
71 See Tucker, 417 U.S. at 437 (noting that the interrogation of Tucker occurred prior to the Court's
decision in Miranda, but the trial occurred afterwards).
72 Id. at 446.
73 Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 308 (1985) (citing Tucker, 417 U.S. at 446 (1974)) (stating that
the Tucker decision was not controlled by the doctrine that fruits of a constitutional violation must
suppressed).
2011] 387
JOURNAL OF CIVIL RIGH7S & ECONOMCDEVELOPMENT [Vol.25:2
compulsory self-incrimination was a separate question from whether that
conduct violated the prophylactic Miranda rules developed to protect that
right.74 The Court concluded that the suspect's unwarned testimony was
inadmissible at trial, but that the testimony of a man whom he identified to
law enforcement in statements made during that questioning was
admissible. 75
In Oregon v. Elstad,76 the Supreme Court built on the holding of Tucker
and further differentiated a Miranda violation from a Fourth Amendment
violation. 77 A violation of Miranda does not necessarily involve an actual
infringement on the suspect's constitutional rights7 8 since the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is not violated absent some
officially coerced self-accusation. 79 The Court determined that the Miranda
protections "[sweep] more broadly then the Fifth Amendment itself,"o
providing a remedy "even to [a] defendant who has suffered no identifiable
constitutional harm." 81
A "simple failure to administer the [Miranda] warnings, unaccompanied
by any actual coercion or other circumstances calculated to undermine the
suspect's ability to exercise his free will," does not taint the investigatory
process so greatly "that a subsequent voluntary and informed waiver is
ineffective. . . ." 82 The Court in Elstad held that "a suspect who has once
responded to unwarned yet noncoercive questioning is not thereby disabled
from waiving his rights and confessing after he has been given the requisite
Miranda warnings." 83 The Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule therefore
does not apply when questioning merely departs from the prophylactic
standards of Miranda since there is "no actual infringement of the suspect's
74 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 451 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Michigan v.
Tucker, 417 U.S. at 439) (explaining the Court's reasoning in Tucker).
75 See Tucker, 417 U.S. at 452 (holding that the suspect's statements were properly excluded from
trial, but that the testimony of the witness identified in those statements should have been admitted).
76 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
77 Id. at 308; Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 453 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Elstad, 470 U.S. at 308)
(explaining that in Elstad, the Court distinguished the case "from those holding that a confession
obtained as a result of an unconstitutional search is inadmissible. . . .").
78 Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 453 (noting that a distinction was made between Elstad and other cases
"on the ground that the violation of Miranda [did] not involve an 'actual infringement of the suspect's
constitutional rights[.]"').
79 New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984) (explaining that without an "'officially coerced
self- accusation, the Fifth Amendment privilege is not violated by even the most damning admissions."'
(quoting United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187 (1977))).
80 Elstad, 470 U.S. at 306.
81 Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 453 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("'Miranda's preventative medicine provides
a remedy even to the defendant who has suffered no identifiable constitutional harm.' (quoting Elstad,
470 U.S. at 308)).
82 Elstad, 470 U.S. at 309.
83 Id. at 318.
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constitutional rights" absent actual compulsion. 84
Tucker and Elstad stand for the principle that errors made by law
enforcement in administering the prophylactic Miranda warnings will not
have the same consequences as violations of the Fifth Amendment.85 While
a confession taken in violation of the Miranda procedures must be
suppressed, "absent coercion, any other evidence derived from a voluntary
confession will be admitted." 86
II. THE "PUBLIC-SAFETY EXCEPTION" TO THE MTRANDA
WARNINGS REQUIREMENT AND WHETHER IT IS APPROPRIATE
TO ADOPT IT TO EXCUSE AN EDWARDS VIOLATION THAT
OCCURS DURING EXIGENT "PUBLIC-SAFETY" CIRCUMSTANCES
This section examines the "public-safety exception" to the
administration of the Miranda warnings and the justification behind it.87 It
then discusses the rationale for adopting this exception to excuse a
violation of the Edwards bright-line rule that occurs during an exigent
"public safety" circumstance. 88 Finally, it argues that both the nature and
the procedure of the Edwards rule distinguishes it from the Miranda
prophylactic safeguard, and therefore the "public-safety exception" is not
the proper doctrine to apply in these circumstances.
84 Id. at 308 (stating that in Michigan v. Tucker, the Court concluded that unwarned questioning
did not abridge respondent's constitutional privilege, but rather only violated prophylactic standards,
and since there was no actual infringement of the suspect's constitutional rights, the exclusionary rule
did not apply).
85 See Elstad, 470 U.S. at 309 ("If errors are made by law enforcement officers in administering the
prophylactic Miranda procedures, they should not breed the same irremediable consequences as police
infringement of the Fifth Amendment itself."); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 446 (1974)
(explaining that because the law cannot "realistically require that policemen investigating serious
crimes make no errors whatsoever," a court must carefully consider whether a "sanction serves a valid
and useful purpose" before if penalizes police error).
86 Gottsfield, supra note 31, at 13-14 ("There is a difference between the issues presented by
whether Miranda warnings were properly given and the voluntariness of a confession in a criminal
prosecution.").
87 See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655-56 (1984) (articulating the "public safety
exception").
88 See United States v. DeSantis, 870 F.2d 536, 541 (9th Cir. 1989) ("The same considerations that
allow the police to dispense with providing Miranda warnings in a public safety situation also would
permit them to dispense with the prophylactic safeguard that forbids initiating further questioning of an
accused who requests counsel."); United States v. Mobley, 40 F.3d 688, 692 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding
that it agrees with the Ninth Circuit that the "public-safety exception" to the Miranda warnings should
be recognized when Edwards is violated in public safety circumstances).
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A. The Quarles "Public-Safety Exception"
In New York v. Quarles,89 the Supreme Court modified the general rule
that unwarned statements must be suppressed9O by admitting statements
obtained prior to the administration of the Miranda Warnings in an exigent
"public safety" circumstance. 91 In Quarles, two New York City police
officers were on road patrol in Queens when a young woman approached
their car and told them that a black male had just raped her.92 She gave the
officers a description of the man and told them that he had just entered a
nearby supermarket carrying a gun.93 The officers drove with the woman to
the supermarket where they spotted the suspect near the checkout
counter.94 One of the officers pursued him through the store, losing sight of
him for several seconds before finally ordering him to stop and put his
hands over his head.95 The officer frisked the suspect and discovered that
he was wearing an empty shoulder holster.96 The officer handcuffed the
suspect and then asked him where the gun was. The suspect responded by
nodding in the direction of some empty cartons and saying "the gun is over
there." 97 The suspect was then read his Miranda warnings.98 The New York
Court of Appeals concluded that the exigencies of the situation did not
justify the officer's failure to read the suspect his Miranda rights until after
they had located the gun99 and thus upheld the suppression of the suspect's
statement. 100
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed,' 0 determining that
the need for answers to questions in a situation posing a threat to the public
safety outweighed the need for the prophylactic rule protecting the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.102 Since there was no
89 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
90 See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 309 (1985) (explaining that an unwarned confession must
be suppressed).
91 See Quarles, 467 U.S. at 659 (holding that the Court of Appeals of New York erred in excluding
from trial the incriminating statements made by the suspect based on the police officer's failure to read
the suspect his Miranda rights due to exigent circumstances).
92 Id. at 651.
93 Id. at 651-52.
94 Id. at 652.
95 Id
96 Id
97 Quarles, 467 U.S. at 652.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 653.
100 Id. at 652-53.
101 Id.at659-60.




claim that the suspect's statements were coerced, the only issue before the
Court was whether the officer was justified by the circumstances for failing
to administer the Miranda warnings.103 Based on the above facts, the Court
created a "public-safety exception" to the requirement that Miranda
warnings must be given before a suspect's statements may be admitted into
evidence. 104 When exigent circumstances "pose a threat to the public
safety, a police officer may question suspects prior to advising them of
their rights" 05 and any statements that are made may be admitted into
evidence.106 "[T]he availability of [this] exception does not depend upon
the motivation of the individual officers involved" 07 and applies in
situations in which police officers ask questions reasonably prompted 08 by
a concern for the public safety' 09 or the safety of the officers at the
scene. 110
Procedural safeguards that deter a suspect from responding to police
questioning were deemed acceptable in Miranda to protect the Fifth
Amendment privilege because "the primary social cost of those added
protections [was] the possibility of fewer convictions." 11  In exigent
circumstances, however, the Supreme Court determined that the cost would
be more than merely fewer convictions; the cost would be the inability to
protect the public from the danger of a concealed gun in a public area.1 12
103 Quarles, 467 U.S. at 654-55 ("In this case we have before us no claim that respondent's
statements were actually compelled by police conduct which overcame his will to resist .... [T]hus the
only issue before us is whether [the officer] was justified in failing to make available [the Miranda
warnings.]").
104 Id. at 655-56 (articulating the public safety exception to the requirement that Miranda warnings
be given before a suspect's answers may be admitted into evidence).
105 STEVE ANDREW DRIZIN, Supreme Court Review: Fifth Amendment - Will the Public Safety
Exception Swallow The Miranda Exclusionary Rule?: New York v. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. 2526 (1984), 75
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 692, 700 (1984) (discussing the holding in Quarles).
106 See Quarles, 467 U.S. at 660 (holding that the New York Court of appeals erred by excluding
the unwarned statement).
107 Id at 656 (indicating that an individual officer's motivation has no effect on the public safety
exception to the Miranda rights of an individual).
108 Id. at 658-59 ("We think police officers can and will distinguish almost instinctively between
questions necessary to secure their own safety or the safety of the public and questions designed solely
to elicit testimonial evidence from a suspect.").
109 See id. at 656 ("Whatever the motivation of individual officers in such a situation, we do not
believe that the doctrinal underpinnings of Miranda require that it be applied in all its rigor to a
situation in which police officers ask questions reasonably prompted by a concern for the public
safety.").
110 United States v. DeSantis, 870 F.2d 536, 539 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing Quarles, 467 U.S. at 658-
59) (noting that the exception applies to "both the public at large and the officers on the scene.").
ill Quarles, 467 U.S. at 657 (stating that the Court acknowledges the reality that giving individuals
Miranda rights could lead to fewer convictions because of the individual's ability to withhold
information that could incriminate himself).
112 See id. ("[The officer] needed an answer to his question not simply to make his case against
Quarles but to insure that further danger to the public did not result from the concealment of the gun in
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For the majority, this cost was too great.1 3 "[T]he need for answers to
questions in a situation posing a threat to the public safety outweighs the
need for the prophylactic rule protecting the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination."ll 4
B. The Rationale Behind Adopting the "Public-Safety Exception" to
Excuse an Edwards Violation that Occurs During Exigent "Public
Safety" Circumstances
In United States v. DeSantis,' '5 the Ninth Circuit was the first appellate
courtl 6 to determine that the "public-safety exception" was applicable to
excuse an Edwards violation that occurred in an exigent "public-safety"
situation.1 17 An Edwards violation occurs when police continue to question
a suspect during a custodial interrogation after he has invoked his right to
an attorney. 1'8 Four compelling interests should be kept in mind while
reading this section. Does the adoption of the "public-safety exception"
strike the proper balance between the public safety, the suspect's right
against self-incrimination and right to an attorney, the admissibility of
statements obtained during continued questioning, and the admissibility of
derivative physical evidence?
In DeSantis, the suspect was arrested in his apartment by U.S. marshals
pursuant to an arrest warrant. 19 The officers searched the suspect for
weapons, conducted a security sweep of his apartment to ensure that no one
else was there, and then read the suspect his Miranda warnings.120 At this
point, the suspect asked if he would be going to court, and the officer
responded that he would be.121 The suspect then asked if he could change
his clothes because he was barefoot and wearing jogging pants and a t-shirt.
a public area.").
113 See id. at 657-58 (explaining that there are times when officers should be free to protect the
public without having to make split-second value judgments about the admissibility of evidence).
114 Idat657.
115 870 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1989).
116 See id at 538 ("We are called upon ... to decide whether the 'public safety' exception ...
applies to the situation in which an accused asserts a right to speak with counsel. This [is a] question of
first impression ..... ); United States v. Mobley, 40 F.3d 688, 692 (4th Cir. 1994) (noting that the
Ninth Circuit was the only circuit to address this question).
117 See DeSantis, 870 F.2d at 541 ("The same considerations that allow the police to dispense with
providing Miranda warnings in a public safety situation also would permit them to dispense with the
prophylactic safeguard that forbids initiating further questioning of an accused who requests counsel.").
118 Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981) (holding that a police interrogation must
cease once the suspect has requested to speak to an attorney).





He indicated to the officers that his clothing was in the adjoining
bedroom.122 One of the officers asked him whether there were any weapons
in the bedroom.123 The suspect responded in the affirmative, telling officers
that there was a gun on the shelf in the closet.124 In his testimony, the
suspect claimed that he had asked to call his lawyer as soon as the officers
entered the apartment but the officer refused to allow him to do so. 125 On
appeal to the Ninth Circuit, he contended that the statements and gun were
erroneously admitted into evidence in violation of his conditional rights
under the Fifth Amendment.126
The Ninth Circuit decided that the procedural protection of the Edwards
rule must give way to the overriding concern for public safety.' 27 The same
considerations in the Quarles case "that allow the police to dispense with
providing Miranda warnings in a public-safety situation also would permit
them to dispense with the prophylactic safeguard that forbids initiating
further questioning of an accused who requests counsel." 28
The court determined that society's need to procure information about
the location of a dangerous weapon is as great after the request for counsel
as it was before.129 The officers' questions were intended to secure their
own protection rather then to elicit testimonial evidence.130 The court
concluded that like Miranda violations that occur during exigent "public-
safety" circumstances, the Edwards prophylactic rule should be
disregardedl3' and the focus should be on whether the statements in
question were obtained coercively.132 Both the gun and the suspect's
voluntary statement were held to be admissible.133 This was the first time a





126 Id at 537-38.
127 Id. at 538 ("Because we find that the procedural protections erected in Edwards and Jackson
must give way to the overriding concerns of public safety in this case, we reject DeSantis'
contention.").
128 Id at 541.
129 Id. (reasoning that the public safety outweighs badgering an accused).
130 Id. (discussing whether the officers coerced DeSantis into making a confession).
131 Id. (applying the reasoning in Quarles to the Edwards rule violation).
132 See id (noting that when continued police questioning is motivated by the necessity "to secure
their own safety or the safety of the public," the court must consider the totality of the circumstances to
determine whether the suspect was coerced into his statements).
133 See id (concluding that the inspectors were lawfully entitled to question DeSantis for the
purpose of securing their safety even after DeSantis asserted his desire to speak with counsel, and since
his decision to respond to the questioning was voluntary, the statements and the firearm could be
admitted into evidence).
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into evidence.' 34
The Fourth Circuit was the next appellate court to apply the "public-
safety exception" to an Edwards violation.135 In United States v.
Mobley,136 the Fourth Circuit agreed that a danger to the public is just as
evident after the Miranda warnings have been given as before.137
Therefore, "the same considerations that allow the police to dispense with
providing Miranda warnings in a public safety situation also [permits] them
to dispense with the prophylactic safeguard that forbids initiating further
questioning of an accused who requests counsel." 38
In Mobley, the suspect was encountered naked and by the time he was
arrested, the FBI had already made a security sweep of his premises.139 As
he was being led away, an FBI agent asked him whether there were any
weapons present.140 The court found that "these facts contrasted sharply
with those in Quarles."l41 The court held that in general, the Quarles
"public-safety exception" would be applicable to Edwards violations that
occur during exigent "public safety" circumstances. 142 However, no such
danger was apparent from the facts of this particular case. 143 When the
circumstances presented do not pose an objective danger to the public or
police, the suspicion is that the police are fishing for information. 144 This
concern about bad faith therefore outweighs the claim that the improper
questioning was motivated by public safety.145
134 See United States v. Mobley, 40 F.3d 688, 692 (4th Cir. 1994) (explaining that the Ninth
Circuit was the only court to have addressed whether the reasoning behind Quarles could be "appl[ied]
with equal force to the procedural safeguards established when the accused asks for the aid of counsel"
and holding that absent coercion by arresting officers, such questions do not need to be suppressed
(quoting United States v. DeSantis, 870 F.2d 536, 541)).
135 See id at 692 (agreeing with the Ninth Circuit that the "public-safety exception" to the Miranda
warnings should be recognized when Edwards is violated in public safety circumstances).
136 40 F.3d 688 (4th Cir. 1994).
137 Id. at 692 (noting that "the danger to the public and police from hidden traps and discarded
weapons is as evident after the Miranda warnings have been given as before .....
138 Id. (quoting DeSantis, 870 F.2d at 541).
139 See id. at 693.
140 See id.
141 Id
142 See id. ("Although we believe that the public safety exception is a valid and completely
warranted exception to the Miranda and Edwards rules, we are persuaded that there was no
demonstration of an "immediate need" that would validate protection under the Quarles exception in
this instance.").
143 See id. (indicating that there must not have been any extraordinary circumstances during the
arrest to prompt the questioning because there was no explanation as to such circumstances).
144 See id. (concluding that if there is no objective danger present in the circumstances, the
suspicion that the police are on a fishing expedition will outweigh the belief that the questioning was
motivated by public safety).
145 Id. (recognizing the need for a narrow construction of the "public safety exception" to avoid
potential injustices perpetrated by police).
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Both the Ninth and Fourth Circuits believe the Edwards rule to be a mere
prophylactic safeguard.146 This conception of the Edwards rule provides
the underlying rationale to justify applying the "public-safety exception" to
the Miranda safeguard to excuse Edwards violations.1 47 Since these courts
view both the Miranda procedures and Edwards rule as mere prophylactic
safeguards rather than constitutional rights,148 they apply the "public-safety
exception" to excuse both types of violations. 149 Cases in other appellate
jurisdictions have subsequently adopted the rationale of DeSantis and
Mobley and have expanded the "public-safety exception" to excuse
Edwards violations occurring during exigent "public-safety"
circumstances. 150
C. The Nature and Procedure of the Edwards Rule Distinguishes it From
the Miranda Prophylactic Safeguard Making it Inappropriate to Adopt
the "Public-Safety Exception" in these Circumstances
Miranda "announced a constitutional rule."151 That rule, however, is not
146 See United States v. DeSantis, 870 F.2d 536, 538 (9th Cir. 1989) (referring to the Edwards rule
as a "procedural safeguard"); Mobley, 40 F.3d at 692 (stating that the Edwards rule is a "prophylactic
safeguard").
147 See DeSantis, 870 F.2d at 541 (applying the reasoning behind the "public-safety exception" to
the procedural safeguard established when the accused asks for the aid of counsel); Mobley, 40 F.3d at
692 (agreeing with the Ninth Circuit's rationale in DeSantis and holding that the "public-safety
exception" will apply in an Edwards situation).
148 See DeSantis, 870 F.2d at 541 (explaining that Edwards, like Miranda "'did not confer a
substantive constitutional right that had not existed before ..... (quoting Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S.
638, 644 n.4 (1984))); Mobley, 40 F.3d at 692 (noting that "the same considerations that allow the
police to dispense with providing the Miranda warnings in a public safety situation also would permit
them to dispense with the prophylactic safeguard that forbids initiating further questioning of an
accused who requests counsel").
149 See Mobley, 40 F.3d at 693 ("[Tlhe public safety exception articulated in Quarles will apply in
an Edwards situation as well.").
150 See Trice v. United States, 662 A.2d 891, 895 (D.C. 1995) (concluding that the reasoning in
Quarles justifying a public safety exception to Miranda "may be extended, logically, to a situation in
which the police initiate questioning after the subject has invoked the right to counsel - for the
straightforward reason that the danger does not abate with Miranda warnings ..... ); Borrell v. State,
733 So.2d 1087, 1089-90 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that a post-Miranda interrogation of the
defendant did not violate his rights because the questioning was justified by an objectively reasonable
need to protect the police and the public from danger); State v. Davis, No. 96-CO-44, 1999 WL
1050092, at *6 (Ohio App. Nov. 19, 1999) (explaining that "public safety" exception to the "Miranda
rule extends to a situation where a suspect has been informed of his Miranda rights and invokes his
right to counsel, but only in certain narrow circumstances"). Contra United States v. Anderson, 929
F.2d 96, 102 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that exigent circumstances did not excuse coercive interrogation
tactics); State v. Pante, 739 A.2d 433, 439 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999) (refusing to allow exigent
circumstances to excuse an Edwards violation); People v. Zanini, No. F038571, 2003 WL 103464, at *7
(Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 10, 2003) (concluding that although situations may arise in which statements
inadmissible under the Edwards no-recontact rule are rendered admissible in the prosecution's case-in-
chief because of the public safety exception, that justification does not warrant the admission of the
statements in this case).
151 United States v. Dickerson, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000) (respecting the principle of stare decisis
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immutable.152 An infringement upon a suspect's Miranda rights is not
automatically an infringement upon his Fifth Amendment rights.153
Miranda sweeps more broadly then the Fifth Amendment itself and
therefore "Miranda's preventative medicine [can provide] a remedy even to
the defendant who has suffered no identifiable constitutional harm." 54 The
Supreme Court has recognized the difference between an unwarned
interrogation and an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment and
has refused to apply the "fruits of the poisonous tree" exclusionary rule to a
procedural Miranda violations55 when the subsequent statements were
voluntary.156 An Edwards violation occurs when police continue
questioning a suspect in a custodial interrogation after he has invoked his
right to counsel. 157 A valid waiver of the right to counsel cannot be
established by showing only that the suspect responded to further police
initiated questioning, even if he had been advised of his rights.158 Due to
the nature and procedure of the Edwards rule, continued questioning of a
suspect who has invoked his right to counsel should be distinguished from
a Miranda violationl59 and be considered a violation of a suspect's Fifth
Amendment rights. 160
and declining to overrule Miranda).
152 See id at 441 (noting that the exceptions to the Miranda procedure illustrate that no
constitutional rule is immutable).
153 See id. at 453 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[T]he violation of Miranda does not involve an 'actual
infringement of the suspect's constitutional rights."' (quoting Elstad v. Oregon, 470 U.S. 298, 308
(1985))); United States v. Cherry, 794 F.2d 201, 204 (5th Cir. 1986) (explaining that Elstad mandates
an inquiry into whether or not a suspect's Fifth Amendment rights were violated when his Miranda
rights are violated).
154 Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 453 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Elstad, 470 U.S. at 306-07).
155 See id (discussing the Court's refusal in Elstad to adopt the Fourth Amendment exclusionary
rule to a Miranda violation).
156 See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 318 (1985) (requiring that statements made by a suspect
responding to unwarned yet uncoercive questioning be suppressed, but allowing the admission of
subsequent statements made after the suspect has chosen to waive his Miranda rights).
157 See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981) (holding that "an accused, such as
Edwards, having expressed his desire to deal with police only through counsel, is not subject to further
interrogation by authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself
initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police").
158 See Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484 (explaining that when the accused has invoked his right to have
counsel present during custodial interrogation, the accused's response to police-initiated interrogation
does not equate to a relinquishment of that right); see also Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 205-
07 (1964) (holding that where the suspects invokes his right to consel, and then federal agents
deliberately elicit information from the suspect in the absence of counsel, the statements are
inadmissible at trial).
159 See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 453 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (explaining that "the violation of
Miranda does not involve an 'actual infringement of the suspect's constitutional rights"' (citing Elstad,
470 U.S. at 308)).
160 See Minnick v. Mississippi 498 U.S. 146, 153 (1990) (indicating that the Supreme Court has
interpreted the holding in Edwards to mean that "authorities may not initiate questioning of the accused
in counsel's absence" and that statements made in the absence of counsel violate the Fifth Amendment);
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In State v. Harris,161 the Wisconsin Supreme Court distinguished
between violations of Miranda procedures and violations of the Edwards
bright-line rule.162 Although the interrogation that occurred in that case
could be described as being motivated by a threat to "public-safety," 63 the
court did not specifically discuss whether or not the "public-safety
exception" should be expanded to excuse the Edwards violation that
transpired there.164 Rather, the court concluded that the nature of the
Edwards rule required that the "public-safety exception" not be applied to
excuse Edwards violations.165
In Harris, the police initiated a conversation with a murder suspect who
they knew had invoked his right to an attorney.166 The police officers
claimed they merely wanted to speak with him in order to advise him of the
charges against him and to assess his demeanor for security purposes
because they would be extraditing him from Amarillo to Milwaukee on
public carriers.167 During that conversation, the police told the suspect that
they had arrested one of his associates back in Milwaukee and had charged
him with the same murder. The suspect responded that his associate "had
nothing to do with it."168 The suspect then indicated that he wanted to tell
the officers about the offense.169 The police gave the suspect his Miranda
warnings and the suspect indicated that he was willing to waive his right to
an attorney.170 He then made out a full confession, admitting to the killing
and telling the officers how and where he had disposed of the murder
State v. Harris, 544 N.W.2d 545, 553 (Wis. 1996) ("A violation of Edwards is a violation of the right to
counsel under the Fifth Amendment.").
161 544 N.W.2d 545 (Wis. 1996).
162 See id. at 553 (explaining that a crucial difference between Miranda and Edwards is that the
procedure under Miranda is that "warnings must be given prior to custodial interrogation[,]" whereas
the procedure required by Edwards "is that once a suspect invokes the right to counsel, all police-
initiated questioning must cease until counsel is present"); see also United States v. Downing, 665 F. 2d
404, 409 (1st Cir. 1981) (holding that any evidence obtained as a result of a violation of a suspect's
Fifth Amendment right to have counsel present during interrogation is inadmissible at trial); United
States ex rel. Hudson v. Cannon, 529 F.2d 890, 892 (7th Cir. 1976) (noting that a violation of the Fifth
Amendment right to counsel invokes the "fruit of the poisonous tree" exclusionary rule).
163 See Harris, 544 N.W.2d at 547 (stating that the officers' motivation behind the questioning was
to assess the suspect's demeanor for security reasons because they had to escort him on public carriers).
164 See id at 553 (basing the ruling on other grounds).
165 See id. (explaining that although one can violate Miranda procedures without violating the Fifth
Amendment, "a violation of Edwards is a violation of the right to counsel under the Fifth
Amendment").
166 See id at 547 (describing how the officers reviewed the police reports that indicated that Harris
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weapon.171 At trial, the suspect moved to suppress his statements and the
derivative evidence because it had been obtained in violation of
Edwards.172
The Wisconsin Supreme Court distinguished an Edwards violation from
a mere defect in the administration of the Miranda warnings.173 The court
noted that in Elstad,174 the issue before the United States Supreme Court
was whether an initial failure to administer the Miranda warnings, "without
more," tainted the subsequent admission that was made after a suspect had
been fully advised of, and had chosen to waive, his Miranda rights.175 An
Edwards violation occurs after the Miranda warnings have been given,
have been understood, and have been invoked. 176 The Supreme Court has
made it clear that the failure to administer the Miranda warnings in and of
itself is not a constitutional infringement.177 However, the Court has never
equated "failure to administer the warnings with failure to 'carry out the
obligations' of Miranda."l78 In fact, the United States Supreme Court has
explicitly distinguished cases in which the police continue interrogations in
spite of the suspect's invocation of the right to counsel from cases in which
the police fail to administer the Miranda warnings.179
In Harris, the Wisconsin Supreme Court found that a violation of
Edwards is unlike a mere defect in the administration of the Miranda
warnings. 80 A violation of Edwards is a violation of a constitutional
171 See id. at 547-48
172 See id (explaining the lower court's finding in the suppression hearing that Harris had asserted
his right to counsel and that the Edwards per se exclusionary rule for his subsequent statement had been
triggered).
173 See id. at 552 (noting that Cherry, Tucker, and Elstad involved only defects in the
administration of Miranda warnings).
174 Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
175 Harris, 544 N.W.2d. at 551 (quoting Elstad, 470 U.S. at 300) (illustrating that the Court in
Elstad framed the issue as whether an initial failure to administer Miranda warnings taints admissions
made after proper Miranda warnings).
176 See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 478-79 (1981) (describing how the suspect in Edwards
was given his Miranda rights, invoked his right to an attorney, and was then subject to continued
interrogation by the police).
177 See Harris, 544 N.W.2d. at 552 (stating that "'failure to give or carry out the obligation of
Miranda warnings in and of itself is not a constitutional infringement' (quoting United States v.
Cherry, 794 F.2d 201, 207 (5th Cir. 1986))).
178 Id.
179 Id. at 553 ("'[I]inapposite are the cases the dissent cites concerning suspects whose invocation
of their rights to remain silent and to have counsel present were flatly ignored . . . ." (quoting Elstad,
470 U.S. at 312-13 n.3)); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 448 n.22 (1974) (determining that a case
in which a suspect's express and repeated requests to see his lawyer were denied was in direct contrast
to a case where an interrogation occurred without proper Miranda procedure).
180 See Harris, 544 N.W.2d at 553. ("We find that there is a critical difference between a mere
defect in the administration of Miranda warnings 'without more' and police-initiated interrogation
conducted after a suspect unambiguously invokes the right to have counsel present during
questioning.").
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right.181 "The right [of a suspect] to have counsel present at the
interrogation is indispensable to the protection of the Fifth Amendment
privilege . . . ."182 There is a critical difference between a violation of
procedure and a violation of a right.183 While it is possible to violate the
procedure required under Miranda in a manner that does not violate the
right that it protects, it is not possible to do the same with a violation of
Edwards since a violation of Edwards is a violation of the right to counsel
under the Fifth Amendment. 184 The jurisdictions that apply the "public-
safety exception" to excuse an Edwards violation fail to make this
distinction as to the nature of an Edwards violation.185
A distinction between Miranda and Edwards procedures exists as well.
A determination of whether or not a statement is "voluntary" is important
in distinguishing a Miranda violation from a Fifth Amendment
violation. 186 If the Miranda procedure is violated, the question becomes
whether the suspect's statements were voluntary.187 There is no similar
prescription for such an inquiry with a violation of Edwards.188
The "public-safety exception" is applied by courts to excuse the
questioning of a suspect that occurred during exigent circumstances
181 See id. (stating that "[a] violation of Edwards is a violation of the right to counsel under the
Fifth Amendment").
182 Id at 550 (quoting Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 682 n.4 (1988)).
183 See id. at 553 (indicating that the primary flaw in the State's argument was the failure to
distinguish between informing an accused of his rights, and a violation of the right to have counsel
present during an interrogation); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974) (distinguishing between
a violation of Miranda procedure and a violation of a constitutional right by noting that the procedural
safeguards under Miranda are "not themselves rights protected by the Constitution but fare] instead
measures to insure that the right against compulsory self-incrimination [is] protected").
184 See Harris, 544 N.W.2d at 553 (explaining that a Miranda violation is a breach of a safeguard,
and not of a constitutional right, whereas an Edwards violation is a breach of the constitutional right to
counsel under the Fifth Amendment).
185 See, e.g., United States v. Mobley, 40 F.3d 688, 692 (4th Cir. 1994) (referring to the Edwards
rule as a "prophylactic safeguard"); United States v. DeSantis, 870 F.2d 536, 538 (9th Cir. 1989)
(stating that the Edwards rule is a "procedural safeguard").
186 See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 309 (1985) (determining that it was "an unwarranted
extension of Miranda to hold that a simple failure to administer the warnings, unaccompanied by any
actual coercion or other circumstances calculated to undermine the suspect's ability to exercise his free
will, so taints the investigatory process that a subsequent voluntary and informed waiver is ineffective .
187 See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 432-33 (2000) (describing how prior to
Miranda, the Supreme Court evaluated the admissibility of a suspect's confession under a voluntariness
test); Tucker, 417 U.S. at 441 (discussing how "[b]efore Miranda the principal issue [to determine Fifth
Amendment violations]... was . . . whether [the defendant's] statement was 'voluntary"'); Gottsfield,
supra note 31, at 13 (stating that "[t]here is a difference between the issues presented by whether
Miranda warnings were properly given and the voluntariness of a confession in a criminal
prosecution").
188 See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484 (1981) (holding that a valid waiver of the
invocation of the right to counsel cannot be established by showing only that a suspect responded to
further police-initiated custodial interrogation, even if that suspect was advised of his rights).
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without the prior administration of the Miranda warnings.189 If there is a
Miranda violation in non-exigent circumstances, the statements must be
suppressed. The "fruits" of those statements, however, do not have to be
suppressed if the subsequent statements were made knowingly and
voluntarily.190 The "public-safety exception" changed this rule in exigent
circumstances by making admissible the incriminating statements made
without a prior administration of the Miranda warnings.191
In Quarles, the fact that the defendant's statements were voluntary was
crucial to the Court's holding.192 The Quarles Court "merely addresse[d]
the knowing and intelligent aspects of the requirements for waiver of
constitutional rights[,]"l 93 and therefore it can be inferred that the Court's
analysis would have been different had the suspect alleged that his
statement was obtained through coercion. 194 An allegation of coercion does
not change the analysis when dealing with a violation of Edwards.195
In direct contrast to a Miranda procedural violation, the Supreme Court
in Edwards specifically held that "when an accused has invoked his right to
have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that
right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further
police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his
189 See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655 (1984) (holding that "there is a public safety
exception to the requirement that Miranda warnings be given before a suspect's answers may be
admitted into evidence ..... ).
190 See Patane v. United States, 542 U.S. 630, 639 (2004) (explaining that Miranda does not
require discarding uncompelled statements); see also Elstad, 470 U.S. at 309 (finding that although
unwarned admissions must be suppressed, the admissibility of any subsequent statement should turn
solely on whether it is knowingly and voluntarily made).
191 See Quarles, 467 U.S. at 659 (holding that because exigent circumstances existed at the time of
the questioning, the Court of Appeals of New York erred in excluding the suspect's incriminating
statements on account of the police officer's failure to read him his Miranda warnings); see also United
States v. Zubiate, No. 08-CR-507 (JG), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14706, at *19 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2009)
(stating that a narrow exception exists when immediate police questioning is prompted by concern for
public safety).
192 See Quarles, 467 U.S. at 654 ("In this case we have before us no claim that respondent's
statements were actually compelled by police conduct which overcame his will to resist."); see also
United States v. DeSantis, 870 F.2d 536, 540 (9th Cir. 1989) ("The Quarles decision does not warrant
the conclusion that the 'public safety' exception allows the police to obtain involuntary, or coerced,
statements in exigent circumstances.").
193 DeSantis, 870 F.2d at 540.
194 See Quarles, 467 U.S. at 654 (explaining that because there was "no claim that respondent's
statements were actually compelled by police conduct . . . [,]" the only issue before the court concerned
the officer's justification for failing to give proper Miranda warnings); see also DeSantis, 870 F.2d at
540 (explaining that the Quarles decision does not authorize the use of involuntary statements made in
exigent circumstances).
195 See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484 (1981) ("[A] valid waiver of [the right to counsel]
cannot be established by showing only that [a suspect] responded to further police-initiated custodial
interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights.").
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rights."l 96 A suspect who invokes his right to an attorney is not to be
subjected to further questioning until counsel has been made available to
him, unless the suspect initiates further communication, exchanges, or
conversations with the police.197 Therefore, even voluntary responses to
police initiated questioning are in violation of the right to an attorney under
Edwards.198
Unlike police violations of Miranda,199 violations of the Edwards bright-
line rule do not require any further inquiry into whether the statements
made in response to the continued questioning were voluntary. 200 A
violation of Edwards is simply a violation of the right to counsel under the
Fifth Amendment. 201 Therefore, in exigent circumstances, as in all other
circumstances, statements obtained during continued questioning of a
suspect who has invoked his right to an attorney must be suppressed. 202
The jurisdictions that apply the "public-safety exception" to excuse an
Edwards violation fail to make this distinction as to the nature and
procedure of the Edwards rule.203 It is true that "[s]ociety's need to procure
196 Id
197 See Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 147 (1990) ("To protect the privilege against self-
incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment, we have held that the police must terminate
interrogation of an accused in custody if the accused requests the assistance of counsel."); see also
Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85 ("[An accused ... having expressed his desire to deal with the police
only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been
made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or
conversations with the police.").
198 See Minnick, 498 U.S. at 147 ("[O]nce the accused requests counsel, officials may not reinitiate
questioning 'until counsel has been made available' to him" (quoting Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85));
see also Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85 (holding that once an accused invokes his right to counsel, only
he may initiate further communication with police).
199 See Quarles, 467 U.S. at 654 ("In this case we have before us no claim that respondent's
statements were actually compelled by police conduct which overcame his will to resist."); see also
DeSantis, 870 F.2d at 540 ("The Quarles decision does not warrant the conclusion that the 'public
safety' exception allows the police to obtain involuntary, or coerced, statements in exigent
circumstances."); Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 451 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[T]he
question whether the 'police conduct complained of directly infringed upon respondent's right against
compulsory self-incrimination' was a 'separate question' from 'whether it instead violated only the
prophylactic rules developed to protect that right."' (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 439
(1974))).
200 See Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85 (holding that once an accused invokes his right to counsel,
further interrogation without the presence of counsel must cease, unless the accused initiates further
communication with police).
201 State v. Harris, 544 N.W.2d 545, 553 (Wis. 1996) (stating that an Edwards violation is a
violation of the Fifth Amendment's right to counsel); Ferguson v. Commonwealth, 654 S.E.2d 328, 338
(Va. Ct. App, 2007) (holding that a police officer's failure to cease interrogation after a request for
counsel violated the accused's Fifth Amendment rights).
202 See, e.g., Harris, 544 N.W.2d at 552 (citing United States v. Cherry, 794 F.2d 201, 204 (5th
Cir. 1986)) (explaining that in Cherry, the lower court held that when a suspect requests an attorney and
the police do not provide one, the suspect's confession must be suppressed because it violates Miranda
and Edwards,)
203 See United States v. Mobley, 40 F.3d 688, 692 (4th Cir. 1994) (referring to the Edwards rule as
a prophylactic safeguard, yet still extending public safety exception); United States v. DeSantis, 870
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information about the location of a dangerous weapon is as great after, as it
was before, the request for counsel." 204 However, due to the nature and
procedure of the Edwards rule, the same considerations that allow the
police to dispense with providing Miranda warnings in a "public-safety"
situation do not also permit police to continue questioning a suspect who
has invoked the right to counsel. 205 Even if the statements obtained were
voluntary, continued questioning always violates the bright-line rule in
Edwards.206 "A violation of Edwards is a violation of the right to counsel
under the Fifth Amendment." 207 Therefore it is inappropriate to adopt the
"public-safety exception" to excuse an Edwards violation.
III. HOW COURTS SHOULD DEAL WITH AN ED WARDS VIOLATION
THAT OCCURS DURING EXIGENT "PUBLIC-SAFETY"
CIRCUMSTANCES
This section begins by determining that it would be inappropriate to
apply the Fourth Amendment "fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine" 208 to
govern Edwards violations that occur during exigent "public-safety"
circumstances. It then sets forth other Fifth Amendment principles 209 that
F.2d 536, 541 (9th Cir. 1989) (calling the Edwards rule a prophylactic safeguard, yet still applying the
public safety exception).
204 DeSantis, 870 F.2d at 541. See Deleon v. Texas, 758 S.W.2d 621, 625 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988)
(stating that, with regard to the Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination, the need to locate
knives hidden in a volatile prison presented a public safety issue that outweighed the prophylactic
safeguard of the Miranda rights).
205 Contra Desantis, 870 F.2d at 541 (allowing the same considerations that permit the public-
safety exception pre-Miranda to justify the rule in Edwards violations). See M.K.B. Darmer, Lessons
from the Lindh Case: Public Safety and the Fifth Amendment, 68 Brook. L. Rev. 241, 279 (2002)
(arguing that the Edwards rule, no less than Miranda, should be subject to the public safety exception).
206 See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484 (1981) (holding that the interrogation of a suspect
must stop once the suspect invokes his right to an attorney, and that merely demonstrating that the
suspect responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation after requesting counsel and being
advised of his rights does not constitute a waiver); Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 156 (1990)
(stating that police-initiated interrogation after the accused's request for counsel was impermissible
absent initiation by the accused himself).
207 State v. Harris, 544 N.W.2d 545, 553 (Wis. 1996).
208 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963) (articulating that the "fruit of the
poisonous tree doctrine" entails an inquiry into whether the evidence was discovered by the exploitation
of illegal police actions, or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the taint).
209 See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 660 (1984) (O'Conner, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (noting that Miranda does not require the exclusion of nontestimonial evidence from
informal custodial interrogations); United States v. Cherry, 794 F.2d 201, 207-08 (5th Cir. 1986)
(indicating that when a suspect's right to an attorney is ignored, the statements taken in violation of
Miranda should be suppressed, but holding that since the statements were voluntary, the suspect's Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination was not violated and physical evidence derived from that
statement need not be suppressed); see also Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 446-47 (1974)
(determining that when police conduct violates the prophylactic standards laid down in Miranda, but
not the defendant's constitutional privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule does not apply to suppress derivative evidence); Oregon v. Elstad, 470
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provide a framework to create a workable alternative. Next, it proposes
that although law enforcement should be allowed to continue questioning a
suspect after he has invoked his right to counsel during exigent "public
safety" circumstances, the statements obtained during that questioning
should be suppressed at trial. Absent coercion, however, the "fruits" of
those statements should be admissible. Finally, it concludes that this
proposal will strike the proper balance between the public's safety, the
rights of the accused, the admissibility of statements, and the admissibility
of physical evidence.
A. It Is Inappropriate to Adopt the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule
It would be equally inappropriate to adopt the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule to suppress the fruits of an Edwards violation as it would
be to adopt the "public-safety exception." Before the Supreme Court
penalizes a constitutional error, it must consider whether that sanction
serves a valid and useful purpose.2l0 The primary purpose of the
exclusionary rule "'is to deter future unlawful police conduct' in order to
"'effectuate the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable
searches and seizures."' 211 This deterrent purpose "necessarily assumes
that the police have engaged in willful, or at the very least negligent,
conduct which has deprived the defendant of some right."212 The Court has
found that the deterrence rationale behind the exclusionary rule "loses
much of its force" when the police action in question was pursued in
complete good faith.213
It would be inappropriate to apply the exclusionary rule to Edwards
violations that occur during exigent circumstances because there would be
no deterrent effect on police behavior. The availability of a "public-safety
exception" from Quarles does not depend upon the conscious motivation of
U.S. 298, 309 (1985) (finding that a violation of the prophylactic Miranda procedures is not necessarily
a Fifth Amendment violation, and therefore subsequent statements do not need to be suppressed if the
statements were made knowingly and voluntarily).
210 Tucker, 417 U.S. at 446 ("Before we penalize police error, . . . we must consider whether the
sanction serves a valid and useful purpose."); United States v. Watts, 513 F.2d 5 (10th Cir. 1975)
("[B]efore such an error will be penalized it must be determined that such sanction serves a valid and
useful purpose.").
211 Tucker, 417 U.S. at 446 (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974)).
212 Id. at 447.
213 Id. (noting that when an officer acts in complete good faith, the deterrence rational becomes
less compelling); United States v. Spencer, 955 F.2d 814, 817 (2nd Cir. 1992) (holding that without
evidence of coercion or compulsion by an FBI agent, exclusion of evidence would not serve the
deterrent purposes of Miranda).
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the individual officers involved.214 The Supreme Court believed that police
officers can almost instinctively distinguish "between questions necessary
to secure their own safety or the safety of the public and questions designed
solely to elicit testimonial evidence from a suspect." 2 15 The Court believed
that the "public-safety exception" would "not be difficult for police officers
to apply because in each case it will be circumscribed by the exigency
which justifies it."216
The Court's view that the exigent circumstances themselves objectively
justify law enforcement action217 should also be applicable to violations of
Edwards that occur during exigent "public-safety" circumstances. 218 Based
on this rationale, there would be no purpose in applying the exclusionary
rule to Edwards violations that occur during exigent circumstances
because, like with Miranda violations, the exigency itself justifies the
police actions. 219 The deterrence rationale behind the exclusionary rule
loses its force when the court assumes that the questioning is being pursued
in good faith.220
B. Fifth Amendment Principles That Create a Framework for a Workable
Solution
The Fifth Amendment "does not prohibit all incriminating
admissions." 221 The Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-
incrimination is "'not violated by even the most damning admissions"'. ..
"'absent some officially coerced self-accusation."' 222 It "does not protect
an accused from being compelled to surrender nontestimonial evidence
214 New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 656 (1984) ("Whatever the motivation of individual
officers in such a situation, we do not believe that the doctrinal underpinnings of Miranda require that it
be applied in all its rigor to a situation in which police officers ask questions reasonably prompted by a
concern for the public safety.").
215 Id. at 658-59.
216 Id. at 658.
217 Id (stating that the public-safety exception to the Miranda rule "will be circumscribed by the
exigency which justifies it").
218 See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 138 (1990) ("[E]venhanded law enforcement is best
achieved by the application of objective standards of conduct, rather than standards that depend upon
the subjective state of mind of the officer.").
219 See Quarles, 467 U.S. at 658 ("The exception will not be difficult for police officers to apply
because in each case it will be circumscribed by the exigency which justifies it.").
220 See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974) (noting that that the deterrence rationale
behind the exclusionary rule loses much of its force when the police action in question was pursued in
complete good faith).
221 Quarles, 467 U.S. at 654. See United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187 (1977) ("Indeed,
far from being prohibited by the Constitution, admissions of guilt by wrongdoers, if not coerced, are
inherently desirable.")
222 Quarles, 467 U.S. at 654 (quoting Washington, 431 U.S. at 187).
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against himself."223 The Court in Miranda did not determine whether
physical evidence arising out of a violation of its procedures would be
admissible. 224 That determination, however, was made in subsequent
decisions. 225 In fashioning Fifth Amendment Miranda evidentiary rules,
the Court has distinguished between the admissibility of the statements
taken in violation of Miranda and the admissibility of the evidence
identified in those statements. 226 A similar distinction should be made in
creating a rule to govern an Edwards violation that occurs during exigent
"public-safety" circumstances.
In Quarles, Justice O'Conner distinguished the statement obtained in
violation of Miranda from the physical evidence that was derived from that
statement.227 O'Conner concurred in the judgment that the gun was
admissible but dissented from the Court's ruling that the statement "the gun
is over there" was also admissible. 228 She believed that the Court did not
provide sufficient justification for departing from or blurring Miranda's
clear standards, and therefore the Court should have required suppression
of the initial statement but allowed admission of the gun into evidence. 229
O'Conner emphasized the fact that the suspect did not claim that his Fifth
Amendment rights had been abridged, but only that there was a
223 Id. at 666 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part); See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408
(1976) (stating that the Fifth Amendment "applies only when the accused is compelled to make a
testimonial communication that is incriminating").
224 See Quarles, 467 U.S. at 667 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part) ("It is settled that Miranda did
not itself determine whether physical evidence obtained in this manner would be admissible."); Tucker,
417 U.S. at 446, 452 n.26 (noting that even if Miranda were retroactively applied to the facts of the
case, it would not resolve the question of whether testimony arising out of violative procedures must be
excluded).
225 See, e.g., Tucker, 417 U.S. at 446-48 (determining that when police conduct violates the
prophylactic standards laid down in Miranda, but not the defendant's constitutional privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination, the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule does not apply to suppress
derivative evidence); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 309 (1985) (finding that a violation of the
prophylactic Miranda procedures is not necessarily a Fifth Amendment violation, and therefore
subsequent statements need not be suppressed under the exclusionary rule if they were made
knowingly and voluntarily).
226 See, e.g., Tucker, 417 U.S. at 451-52 (holding that the suspect's statements were properly
excluded from trial, but that the testimony of the witness identified in those statements should have
been admitted); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224 (1971) (commenting that Miranda does not bar
evidence that is inadmissible against accused in the prosecution's case in chief for all purposes).
227 See Quarles, 467 U.S. at 660 (O'Conner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("I would
require the suppression of the initial statement taken from respondent . . . [but] nothing in Miranda or
the privilege itself requires exclusion of nontestimonial evidence derived from informal custodial
interrogation, and I therefore agree .... that admission of the gun in evidence is proper.").
228 Id at 660 (O'Conner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (asserting that the
defendant's statements were properly inadmissible, but that the gun should have not have been
suppressed). See Drizin, supra note 105, at 703 (commenting on the distinction established by Justice
O'Connor that the statements were inadmissible, but that the gun should not have been suppressed).
229 See Quarles, 467 U.S. at 660 (O'Conner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(discussing the Court's departure from Miranda's clear standards).
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prophylactic error.230 There is nothing about an exigent circumstance "that
makes custodial interrogation any less compelling;" 231 however, where a
suspect fails to demonstrate actual compulsion that amounts to a violation
of a fundamental right, only the suspect's self-incriminating statement
should be excluded.232
"[N]othing in Miranda or the privilege itself requires the exclusion of
nontestimonial evidence derived from informal custodial interrogation." 233
Since the Miranda warnings and waiver are only required to ensure that the
testimony used against the accused at trial was given voluntarily, once
those statements have been suppressed the failure to administer the
Miranda warnings should no longer be of concern. 234 When the only
evidence to be admitted is derivative evidence that was not derived from
actual compulsion, Miranda does not require suppression. 235 Based on this
rationale, O'Connor concluded that the statements taken in violation of
Miranda should be suppressed, but that nontestimonial derivative evidence
should not.236 A similar rationale should be followed in creating a rule to
deal with Edwards violations that occur during exigent "public-safety"
circumstances.
At least one Circuit Court has distinguished testimonial evidence from
nontestimonial derivative evidence that arises out of a non-exigent
230 See id at 672 n.5 (O'Conner, J., concurring part and dissenting in part) (explaining that the
suspect's only argument was that the police failed to administer the Miranda warnings); Drizin, supra
note 105, at 703 (discussing O'Conner's contention that the suspect in Quarles merely asserted a
"nonconstitutional prophylactic error").
231 Quarles, 467 U.S. at 665 (O'Conner, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (examining
exigent circumstances and the effects on custodial interrogation).
232 See id. at 671 (indicating that there is an distinction between actual and presumed compulsion);
see also Drizin, supra note 105, at 704 (discussing Justice O'Connor's distinction between actual
compulsion amounting to a constitutional violation and presumed compulsion amounting to a Miranda
violation).
233 Quarles, 467 U.S. at 660 (1984) (O'Conner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
234 See id. at 669 (noting O'Conner's concern that Miranda warnings are only to be used for
testimonial self-incriminations); see also Sean Tirrell, Physical Evidence Obtained As A Result Of
Unwarned, Voluntary Statement Held Admissible Despite Failure To Issue Miranda Warnings, 10
SULLFOK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 183, 183 (2005) (discussing the Court's decision not to extend the
exclusionary principle to situations where the police obtain physical evidence as a result of an
unwamed, voluntary statement).
235 Quarles, 467 U.S. at 671 (O'Conner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (explaining
that the values underlying the privilege do not require suppression when the only evidence is derived
from statements taken in the absence of Miranda warnings); United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 643
(2004) (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that a nontestimonial, voluntary statement involving physical
evidence "presents no risk that a defendant's coerced statements will be used against him at a criminal
trial").
236 See Quarles, 467 U.S. at 673 (O'Conner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(explaining that the admission of nontestimonial evidfence is "based on the sensible view that
procedural errors should not cause entire investigations and prosecutions to be lost").
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Edwards violation. 237 In United States v. Cherry,238 the suspect was
informed of his Miranda rights, but subsequently waived those rights,
agreeing to FBI interrogation. 239 At one point during the interrogation, he
remarked that "maybe I should talk to an attorney before I make a further
statement." 240 The FBI agents informed the suspect that an attorney would
probably counsel him to remain silent; however they did not attempt to
provide him with an attorney. The agents did, however, ask if the suspect
wanted to be alone to consider whether to make further statements. 241 At
this point, the suspect asked to see one of his sergeants. 242 While waiting
for the sergeant to arrive, the FBI agents mentioned that fellow soldiers had
seen him with a .32 caliber pistol even though he had told them that he did
not own one.243 The suspect then responded by asking them, "haven't you
found the gun yet?" 244 He then told the agents that the murder weapon was
hidden in the ceiling compartment above his cubicle and confessed to the
murder.245
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed his conviction because the
confession "had been obtained in violation the suspect's rights under
Miranda and [Edwards]. . . ."246 After a second trial and conviction, the
suspect appealed the admissibility of the murder weapon at the second
trial. 247 The Fifth Circuit held that since the suspect's Fifth Amendment
right against self-incrimination was not violated, the murder weapon did
not need to be suppressed as a "fruit" of a Miranda violation.248 The court
concluded that the rejection of a "fruits" doctrine in Tucker and Elstad
could be applied with equal force to the discovery of evidence that arises
237 See United States v. Cherry, 794 F.2d 201, 208 n.6 (5th Cir. 1986) (stating that although the
suspect's confession taken in violation of Edwards was properly suppressed, "different interests prevail
when [the Court] evaluate[s] derivative evidence obtained through the exploitation of statements
obtained in violation of Miranda and Edwards").
238 794 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1986).
239 See id at 203.
240 See id. See generally State v. Harris, 199 Wis.2d 227, 245 (1996) (citing Davis v. United States,
512 U.S. 452, 458 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring)) ("It is notable that Cherry was decided in 1986,
before the Supreme Court's ruling that a request for counsel must be unambiguous in order to preclude
further questioning").




245 See id. at 203-04.
246 Id. at 204.
247 See id. at 205. Cherry argued that the admission of the murder weapon was barred by the
exclusionary rule because it was obtained through a search and seizure that violated the Fourth
Amendment. Id.
248 Id at 208 (holding that since Cherry's statement and consent were voluntary, Tucker and Elstad
apply).
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out of an Edwards violation. 249 The court noted that the admissibility of
physical evidence derived from statements made during continued
questioning requires a separate analysis from that which decides whether
the statements themselves must be suppressed. 250 Statements taken in
violation of Edwards must be suppressed, but as long as those statements
were voluntary, derivative evidence may be admitted at trial.251
The court in Cherry believed that "Elstad makes it clear that the failure
to give or carry out the obligation of Miranda warnings in and of itself is
not a constitutional infringement." 252 "[N]owhere in Elstad does the
[Supreme] Court equate failure to administer warnings with failure to
'carry out the obligations' of Miranda. "253 For the purposes of this note,
the holding of the Fifth Circuit in Cherry is an example of how a court
should distinguish between statements and derivative evidence obtained
from Edwards violations occurring exclusively during exigent "public-
safety" circumstances.
C. The Proposed Solution
In creating a rule to govern Edwards violations that occur during exigent
circumstances, four compelling interests must be balanced: the public's
safety, the suspect's right against self-incrimination and to an attorney, the
admissibility of statements obtained during continued questioning, and the
admissibility of derivative physical evidence. Forcing police during
exigent "public-safety" circumstances to stop questioning a suspect who
has invoked his right to counsel gives too little weight to the public safety
interest. Allowing continued questioning and suppressing all statements
and derivative evidence gives too little weight to the evidentiary interests of
the criminal justice system. Allowing continued questioning all statements
and derivative evidence to be admissible gives too little weight to suspect's
right against self-incrimination.
Based on the principles discussed above and the balancing of the four
249 Id. ("Inasmuch as we find that Cherry's statement and consent were voluntarily given, we are
bound by the reasoning of Tucker and Elstad').
250 See id at 208 n.6 (indicating that confessions taken during continued questioning after the
suspect has invoked the right to counsel must be suppressed, but that derivative evidence may be treated
differently).
251 See id. (concluding that although confessions taken in violation of Miranda and Edwards must
be suppressed, "different interests prevail when [evaluating] derivative evidence obtained through the
exploitation of statements obtained in violation of Miranda and Edward[,]" and therefore such
evidence may be admissible).
252 Id at 207.
253 State v. Harris, 544 N.W.2d 545, 552 (Wis. 1996) (quoting Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 309
(1985)).
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interests, this note proposes that when an Edwards violation occurs during
exigent circumstances, law enforcement should be allowed to continue the
police-initiated questioning of a suspect who has invoked his right to an
attorney. Any statements made during that questioning should be
suppressed, but absent coercion, the "fruits" of those statements should be
admissible.
Despite the justification provided by the exigent circumstances, this note
concludes that statements made by a suspect during continued questioning
in violation of Edwards must be suppressed. Whether responses to police-
initiated questioning after a suspect invokes the right to counsel are
voluntary or not is irrelevant under Edwards.254 Likewise, the bright-line
rule of Edwards does not mention exceptions for when police act in good
faith. 255 A violation of Edwards is a violation of the suspect's Fifth
Amendment rights, 256 and therefore statements made taken in violation
must be suppressed.
A differentiation must be made between the statements taken in violation
of Edwards and any physical evidence that is derived from those
statements. Absent coercion, the "fruits" of those statements should be
admissible at trial. The default Fifth Amendment self-incrimination
standard queries whether a suspect's statements were voluntary. 257 If a
suspect chooses to make voluntary statements while the police are
justifiably denying him access to counsel due to the exigent "public-safety"
circumstances, he must suffer some consequences of a non-coerced self-
incrimination. There would be no deterrent effect furthered by requiring
the suppression of such evidence that was extracted by police in a good-
faith attempt to rectify a threat to public safety. Therefore, the
exclusionary rule should not be adopted to suppress physical evidence that
arises out of an Edwards violation that occurs during exigent "public-
safety" circumstances.
254 See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484 (1981) ("[A] valid waiver of that right cannot be
established by showing only that he responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if
he has been advised of his rights.").
255 See generally id; United States v. Giles, 967 F.2d 382, 386 (10th Cir. 1992) (explaining that
the only exception to the Edwards bright-line rule is "where the accused initiates the conversation with
the police").
256 Harris, 544 N.W.2d at 553 ("A violation of Edwards is a violation of the right to counsel under
the Fifth Amendment.").
257 Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 441 (1974) ("Before Miranda the principal issue [to
determine Fifth Amendment violations] . . . was . . . whether [the defendant's] statement was
voluntary); Gottsfield, supra note 31, at 13 ("There is a difference between the issues presented by
whether Miranda warnings were properly given and the voluntariness of a confession in a criminal
prosecution."). See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306 (1985) ("The Miranda exclusionary rule,
however, serves the Fifth Amendment and sweeps more broadly than the Fifth Amendment itself.").
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D. Why This Proposal Strikes the Proper Balance Between The Four
Interests at Stake
Under this proposal, the public would not have to choose between their
safety and the ability to convict a suspect. If a suspect has information that
can help quell a public safety risk, the police can continue non-coercive
interrogation in order to extract that information from the suspect after he
has invoked his right to counsel. If that questioning produces incriminating
statements that help to subdue the threat to public safety, then the public is
immediately protected. If the questioning leads to derivative physical
evidence that helps convict the suspect at trial, then the public is once again
protected. The public safety interest is properly balanced because law
enforcement would not be forced by exigent "public-safety" circumstances
to sacrifice the future ability to convict a suspect for the immediate public
safety.
This proposal strikes the proper balance in protecting a suspect's Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination and to an attorney. The
proposed rule recognizes the violation of a suspect's right to an attorney by
suppressing statements made in response to police-initiated questioning in
violation of Edwards.258 The Fifth Amendment prohibits only the use of
compelled testimony by the prosecution,259 and thus the Fifth Amendment
protection should only go so far.260 If the suspect chooses to make
voluntary statements during that continued questioning, there will be
consequences adverse to his interests. This proposal would not suppress
the "fruits" of voluntary statements made during that continued
questioning. The proposed rule protects the Fifth Amendment interests of
the suspect only as far as the Constitution demands, thereby striking the
proper balance.
The proposed rule's evidentiary middle-ground approach strikes the
proper evidentiary balance between allowing it all in,261 and allowing
258 See Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85 (holding that custodial questioning must cease when the
accused invokes his right to an attorney).
259 See Elstad, 470 U.S. at 306-07 ("The Fifth Amendment prohibits use by the prosecution in its
case in chief only of compelled testimony."); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984) ("In
Miranda this Court for the first time extended the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination to individuals subjected to custodial interrogation by the police.").
260 See Quarles, 467 U.S. at 654 (quoting United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187 (1977))
(discussing how the Fifth Amendment itself does not prohibit all incriminating admissions, and
therefore the privilege is not violated by even the most damning admissions absent some officially
coerced self-accusation); United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187 (1977) (noting that the Fifth
Amendment does not preclude a witness from voluntarily testifying about matters which may
incriminate him).
261 See United States v. DeSantis, 870 F.2d 536, 541 (9th Cir. 1989) (determining that statements
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nothing in.262 The Constitution demands that statements taken in violation
of Edwards be suppressed. If, however, the self-incrimination is voluntary,
the "fruits" of those offending statements will be admissible. The Fifth
Amendment itself does not prohibit all incriminating admissions, 263 and
therefore the privilege is not violated by even the most damning admissions
"'absent some officially coerced self-accusation.'"264 When the exigency
of the circumstances justify the temporary denial of a suspect's right to
counsel, absent coercion, the "fruits" of the violation should be allowed in,
striking the proper evidentiary balance.
CONCLUSION
Returning to our hypothetical with D.B. Cooper and Lieutenant
McClain, we can now apply the proposed rule in order to determine what
McClain's course of action should be. McClain would be justified by the
exigent circumstances to question Cooper about the whereabouts of the
gun, despite Cooper's invocation of his right to an attorney, in a good faith
effort to ensure the public's safety. If Cooper makes statements in response
to that questioning, he can feel confident that those statements taken in
violation of his right to an attorney will not be used against him in court.
However, Cooper should speak at his own peril, because if he voluntarily
reveals information that leads to the discovery of the gun used in the armed
robbery, that physical evidence may be introduced into evidence against
him at trial. If the gun is found, the members of public will be safe and
they will not have had to trade that immediate safety for the later
suppression of that weapon at trial.
By allowing the continued questioning of a suspect who has invoked his
right to an attorney during exigent circumstances, suppressing the
incriminating statements, and, absent coercion, admitting the evidence that
arises out of those statements, the interests of the neighborhood, McClain,
and Cooper have been properly balanced.
taken in violation of Edwards during "public-safety" circumstances do not need be suppressed unless
there is coercion).
262 See Wisconsin v. Harris, 544 N.W.2d 545, 553 (Wis. 1996) (holding that Edwards violations
trigger the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine and require the suppression of the fruits of that
constitutional violation).
263 See Quarles, 467 U.S. at 654 (noting that the Fifth Amendment does not protect against self
incrimination absent coercion); Washington, 431 U.S. at 187 (explaining that admissions of guilt are
"desirable if they are not coerced").
264 Quarles, 467 U.S. at 654 (quoting United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187 (1977)).
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